Journal Article Terminating Decision Algorithms Optimally 2003 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 2833:950-955 Sandholm T
Conference Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard 2003 • IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 781-788 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference (Im)possibility of safe exchange mechanism design 2002 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 338-344 Sandholm T, Wang XF
Journal Article Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions 2002 • Artificial Intelligence • 135(1-2):1-54 Sandholm T
Conference An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents 2002 • Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents • 135-142 Larson K, Sandholm T
Conference An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents 2002 135-142 Larson K, Sandholm T
Conference Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates 2002 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 314-319 Conitzer V, Sandholm I
Journal Article Contracting With Uncertain Level Of Trust 2002 • Computational Intelligence • 18(4):501-514 Braynov S, Sandholm T
Conference Differential-Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions 2002 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 2531:34-51 Conen W, Sandholm T
Conference Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions 2002 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 2531:69-86 Hudson B, Sandholm T
Journal Article eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server 2002 • Computational Intelligence • 18(4):656-676 Sandholm T
Journal Article Leveled-Commitment Contracting: A Backtracking Instrument for Multiagent Systems 2002 • AI Magazine • 23(3):89-89 Sandholm T, Lesser V
Conference Online algorithms for market clearing 2002 • Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms • 06-08-January-2002:971-980 Blum A, Sandholm T, Zinkevich M
Conference Optimal Clearing of Supply/Demand Curves 2002 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 2518:600-611 Sandholm T, Suri S
Conference Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions 2002 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 367-372 Conen W, Sandholm T
Conference Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions 2002 • Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents • 168-169 Conen W, Sandholm T
