Conference Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency 2003 • Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce • 212-213 Likhodedov A, Sandholm T
Conference Auctions with untrustworthy bidders 2003 • Proceedings - IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce, CEC 2003 • 363-369 Braynov S, Sandholm T
Conference Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer 2003 232-233 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer 2003 • Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce • 232-233 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Journal Article Automated mechanism design: A new application area for search algorithms 2003 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 2833:19-36 Sandholm T
Conference Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting 2003 • Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce • 5:17-24 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Automated mechanism design: Complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting 2003 • ACM International Conference Proceeding Series • 50:17-24 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents 2003 • Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning • 1:83-90 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Preprint AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents 2003 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games 2003 • Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning • 1:91-98 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Preprint BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games 2003 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Journal Article BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations 2003 • Artificial Intelligence • 145(1-2):33-58 Sandholm T, Suri S
Conference Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core 2003 • IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 613-618 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core 2003 • Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce • 230-231 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Complexity results about Nash equilibria 2003 • IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 765-771 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Journal Article Compressing two-dimensional routing tables 2003 • Algorithmica • 35(4):287-300 Suri S, Sandholm T, Warkhede P
Conference Definition and complexity of some basic metareasoning problems 2003 • IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 1099-1106 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions 2003 196-197 Conen W, Sandholm T
Conference Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions 2003 • Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce • 196-197 Conen W, Sandholm T
Conference Generalizing Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions 2003 • Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents • 2:1014-1015 Hudson B, Sandholm T
Conference How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? 2003 • Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2003 • 201-214 Conitzer V, Lang J, Sandholm T
Preprint How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? 2003 Conitzer V, Lang J, Sandholm T
