Conference Coalitional games in open anonymous environments 2005 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 2:509-514 Yokoot M, Conitzer V, Sandholm T, Ohta N, Iwasaki A
Conference Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations 2005 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 1:248-254 Conitzer V, Sandholm T, Santi P
Conference Common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators 2005 • Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2005 • 145-152 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Communication complexity of common voting rules 2005 • Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce • 78-87 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Complexity of (iterated) dominance 2005 • Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce • 88-97 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Computing and Markets 2005 • Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings • 5011: Lehmann D, Müller R, Sandholm T
Conference Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy 2005 • Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents • 495-502 Brandt F, Sandholm T
Conference Designing auctions for deliberative agents 2005 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3435 LNAI:87-100 Larson K, Sandholm T
Conference Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions 2005 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3570:298-312 Brandt F, Sandholm T
Conference Expressive negotiation in settings with externalities 2005 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 1:255-260 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Mechanism design and deliberative agents 2005 • Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents • 779-785 Larson K, Sandholm T
Conference Mixed-integer programming methods for finding Nash equilibria 2005 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 2:495-501 Sandholm T, Gilpin A, Conitzer V
Conference Optimal Rhode Island Hold'em poker 2005 • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence • 4:1684-1685 Gilpin A, Sandholm T
Conference Policy administration control and delegation using XACML and delegent 2005 • Proceedings - IEEE/ACM International Workshop on Grid Computing • 2005:49-54 Seitz L, Rissanen E, Sandholm T, Firozabadi BS, Mulmo O
Conference Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments 2005 • Lecture Notes in Computer Science • 3435:1-14 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
Conference Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation<sup>?</sup> 2005 • Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings • 5011: Sandholm T, Gilpin A
Conference Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions 2005 • Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings • 5011: Brandt F, Sandholm T, Shoham Y
Conference Unconditional privacy in social choice 2005 • Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on the Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge • 207-218 Brandt F, Sandholm T
Conference (Im)possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving auctions 2004 • Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004 • 2:810-817 Brandt F, Sandholm T
Conference An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments 2004 • Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004 • 1:128-135 Conitzer V, Sandholm T
