In Person and Virtual - ET - Belloch-Skees Conference Room, Gates Hillman 8115 and Zoom
MATHEUS VENTURYNE XAVIER FERREIRA , Postdoctoral Fellow, Computer Science, John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
Traditionally one assumes a regulator (or potential future consumers) would punish a platform for deviating from their promised specification. However, this is not always possible, even with publicly available data. For example, auctions are the main building block of how we transact on eBay or how Google sells advertising; however, it is impossible to know whether or not a self-interested auctioneer is also bidding in their auction with a fake identity. In this light, game theory provides a new perspective on designing secure systems because in many real-world applications adversaries are not intentionally malicious, but rather rational and economically driven. First, I will overview the challenges of designing Internet auctions when auctioneers are not trusted and show a cryptographic auction that overcomes known impossibility results from economic theory. Beyond auctions, distributed systems like blockchains aim to enable more transparent applications. In the second part, I will overview my contributions toward the design of incentive-compatible sustainable blockchains and how they allow us to design transparent algorithms.
In Person and Zoom Participation. See announcement.