Computer Science Speaking Skills Talk / SCS Student Seminar

— 1:00pm

In Person - Traffic21 Classroom, Gates Hillman 6501

BRIAN ZHANG , Ph.D. Student, Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University

Mediation in Extensive-Form Games: Mechanism Design, Information Design, and Correlated Equilibria under a Unified Framework

Mechanism design, information design, and correlated equilibria are three problems that are usually treated separately in literature. Mechanism design is the problem faced by a principal attempting to elicit information from agents. Information design is the problem faced by a principal attempting to strategically reveal information to agents. Finally, correlated equilibria in games are distributions of strategy profiles from which no player has any incentive to deviate. 

In this talk, we introduce a unified framework under which these three problems are special cases. Under this framework, we show that polynomial-time algorithms exist under certain conditions, and we argue that the difference between (extensive-form) correlated equilibria and information design is that the former contains privacy constraints, prohibiting the principal from "leaking" information from one player to another.

Presented as part of the SCS Student Seminar Series 

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the CSD Speaking Skills Requirement

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